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Abstract: 
Monetary unions are characterized by contemporary institutional arrangements that entrust 
monetary policy to a supranational entity while fiscal policies are framed by rules imposed on 
the budget deficit. Limits on public deficits are usually justified by the idea that government 
deficits reduce national savings, which ultimately reduces domestic investment and economic 
growth. However, this idea that domestic savings must necessarily increase if investment 
increases cannot be taken for granted. Moreover, it is possible that within the union, 
countries reveal different saving-investment causality, which is capable of rendering 
considerable credibility and effectiveness of budgetary rules of government deficits systematic 
prohibition as a means to revitalize investment. This study raises the question of domestic 
savings-investment causality in an African monetary union with a focus on the WAEMU zone. 
It has been determined in each country from a methodology based on co integration vector 
representations analysis leading to error correction. The existence of a causality 
heterogeneity between savings-investment in this African monetary union leads to consider a 
new model of fiscal coordination in Africa incorporating this heterogeneity, including the 
adoption of a new budget rule more flexible based on a structural balance without public 
investment. 
Key words: monetary union, savings-investment causality, heterogeneity, fiscal coordination. 
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1. Introduction 
The relationship between the domestic savings and investment is one of the biggest 
controversies in macroeconomics. At the heart of the debate is the question of the meaning of 
causality which occurs between these two variables. Is it saving that causes investment or is it 
investment that causes savings? As the theory of natural unemployment rate was the central 
issue in studies of monetary policy, the question of causality between savings and domestic 
investment is in turn decisive for fiscal policy. Indeed, the economic significance of 
government deficits is commonly built around the negative effects they have on the volume of 
domestic savings, and finally on capital formation. Behind this interpretation of the deficits is 
the idea that domestic savings consistently cause domestic investment. Government deficits 
then correspond to a public sector dissaving, which reduces domestic savings, which in turn 
will reduce investment. It is this view which usually justifies the choice of austerity fiscal 
policies or of the inter-temporal budget balance in developing countries plagued by budget 
problems with important consequences in terms of their external payments. If inversely, it is 
investment that causes savings, policies of abstinence from both the government and the 
private sector are needed and can be rather deflationary consequences. What matters then is 
the increase in capital expenditure with multiplier effects that we know. This indicated that 
the appropriate fiscal policy for an economy should be drawn under the constraint of the 
direction of causality which exists between savings and investment, and it also requires an 
empirical determination of causality given the indeterminacy theory that exists in this regard. 
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Transposed to the specific cases of monetary unions, the interest of savings-investment 
causation analysis is multiplied. Indeed, interest in the study of monetary unions, specifically 
their effectiveness, has grown with European unification. From this unification, came out 
several institutional arrangements covering fiscal and monetary aspects (Asongu, 2013a,b,c). 
The monetary policy was entrusted to a supranational and independent of political pressures 
entity, the European Central Bank, when fiscal policy remains the responsibility of national 
authorities. However, the definition of a Community budgetary criterion governing the 
expenditure in the EU
3
 more binds the hands of public authorities of different countries. A 
maximum has been imposed on public deficits which must not exceed 3% of GDP. According 
to several authors (Palley, 1996; Alexiou, 2004). Indeed, the definition of the fiscal 
convergence criterion stated in the monetary union reflects the emergence of a neoliberal 
consensus which suggests that only balanced budgets or surpluses are the keys to revitalize 
domestic investment because government deficits absorb national savings that was intended 
for investment and thereby increases interest rates. Everything happens as the saving-
investment causality is systematic and subject of consensus and more precisely, it would be 
exercised systematically from savings to investment. 
 
Monetary union is a group of several countries with economies often structurally and / or 
conjunctural different sharing a common currency and striving to coordinate their policies. It 
is therefore likely that the degree of structural heterogeneity (productive structures, labor 
markets and financial structures) between countries remains long time after the unification 
with respect to circumstances heterogeneity that would normally fade over time. It comes as 
the specificity of each country may be indicative of saving-investment causality variance from 
one country to another within the monetary union, thereby putting into question the 
Community fiscal rule of government deficits systematic prohibition which is ultimately 
effective if all countries have similar causalities in the direction of domestic savings to 
domestic investment. In the presence of savings-investment heterogeneity causality, the fiscal 
community rule becomes like an asymmetric shock hitting member countries. Given that it 
allows the growth of domestic savings, it will be virtuous only in countries of the Union 
which has revealed causality from savings to investment. In other countries who do not reveal 
such causality, this rule will have recessive consequences. That is why the empirical analysis 
of saving-investment causality becomes important in the context of a monetary union as the 
WAEMU with institutional architecture relatively close to the EU and which could also 
introduce heterogeneities that actual arrangements would have difficulty to manage. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the causality relationship between savings and 
investment in an African monetary union and particularly in the WAEMU zone. More 
specifically, we will (i) determine the causality direction between domestic savings and 
investment in each country and (ii) capture the major fiscal coordination implications in the 
monetary union.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a brief literature review of 
major theoretical and empirical contributions to savings-investment relationship; Section 3 
presents the methodology; Section 4 presents the data and the results obtained and Section 5 
focus on economic policy implications. 
 
2. Empirical and theoretical debate on heterogeneity and the causality sense: 
2.1. Causality direction between savings and investment: The theoretical indeterminacy. 
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The savings-investment relationship is generally known in theory through the divergent 
viewpoints that oppose economists especially concerning the causality direction that prevails. 
For economists called Classics and neoclassical, savings and investment equilibrium are made 
by interest rate on loanable funds market. Moreover, according to traditional analyzes of the 
link between finance and economic development, saving is the precondition for productive 
investment and economic growth, thus economic development (Gurley and Shaw, 1956; 
Goldsmith, 1969). For these authors, the main contribution of the financial system to 
economic growth is based on the fact that it ensures the efficient functioning of payment 
system, which mobilizes savings and improve its allocation to investment through positive 
real interest rates. The assumption of prior savings is also present in models of financial 
liberalization developed by Mckinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973). These models estimate that 
we can increase the level of domestic investment by stimulating the accumulation of domestic 
savings through real positive interest rates and an encouragement of competition between 
financial institutions. Bencivenga and Smith (1991) also showed that financial intermediaries, 
by the allocation of savings to illiquid assets process, and by reducing premature liquidation 
of profitable investments, improve capital productivity, and thus stimulate economic growth. 
The analysis of Keynes (1936) proposes for its part, the reversal of causality, which 
traditionally runs from savings to investment. This new conception of the causal link between 
savings and investment developed by Keynes and recovery more precisely by the post-
Keynesian theories (Godley and Cripps, 1985; Sodokin, 2004) theoretically offers an 
alternative approach to the savings and financial institutions role for economic development. 
In a post-Keynesian perspective, "finance" precedes the "savings" in the financing process of 
productive investment. Through an income multiplication process initiated by investment, it 
ultimately creates a savings in the economy. 
Blecker (1997) goes further by stating that the traditional view that savings generally tends to 
precede the investment can be questioned for two reasons. The first reason is that economic 
policies aimed systematically increasing the savings rate may depress investment in contrast, 
because they have the immediate effect of significantly reducing aggregate demand. The 
second reason is that a reinterpretation of domestic savings role in case of international capital 
mobility environment is relatively high. Indeed, Blecker (1997) and especially Feldstein and 
Horioka (1980) mainly showed that if there is international capital mobility, savings will 
move to regions of the globe that offer a better return than the one of domestic savings. It 
follows that the association between domestic saving and domestic investment will be strong 
when capital mobility and economic integration is low. Other authors also share the view that 
investment precede saving in the process of income creation and multiplication. Skott (1989) 
following the Keynesians considers investment as the key variable. His argument is that firms 
first decide the level of investment to achieve, and later, income and savings are adjusted 
accordingly. For Gordon (1995) as for Harcourt and Spajic (1998), causation in fact, takes 
place from investment to savings. 
2.2. Indeterminacy reinforced at the National Accountability level: 
In open economy, there are four possible uses of goods and services produced. The national 
income identity expressed these four components of gross domestic product (GDP). 
      Y = C + I + G + EXn. 
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With Y the GDP, C the private consumption, I the total investment, G the government 
consumption and EXn is net exports of goods and services obtained by the difference between 
exports of goods and services and imports of the same nature. According to this equation (in 
fact this equality purely accounting), domestic spending which are expenditure made on 
national territory, is the sum of consumption, investment, government spending and net 
exports. This equality shows the links between production and expenditure on the national 
territory. By changing the positions of certain variables in the equation, we get successively: 
Y – C – G = I + EXn.  We know that domestic savings is: Y – C – G.     
Thus, S = I + EXn.     
By subtracting I from the two equation sides, the national income accounting identity can be 
rewritten like follow: 
S – I = EXn.  
This presentation of the national income accounts identity shows that net exports of an 
economy must be equal to the difference between its savings and investment. 
By disaggregating domestic savings into private savings (S
p
) and public (S
g
), we obtain: 
      I = S
p
 + S
g
 – Exn. 
Reasoning from this accounting identity, at the end of period, investment increases only as the 
two components of domestic savings increase. But it is extremely important to emphasize that 
this accounting identity is informational only. It teaches us only that domestic investment is 
equal to the sum of private and public savings net current account, not a causal relationship 
between variables. 
The total savings in the economy is indeed the sum of budget surplus, household savings and 
retained earnings of private enterprises. How can we be sure that the increase in one 
component of domestic savings, for example, will leave other components unchanged? 
Indeed, an increase in taxes, while increasing public savings, will reduce disposable private 
income and hence private savings, thus leaving relatively unchanged the total savings; It is the 
neutrality of boosting investment policy funded on a prior rise in public savings which will be 
observed. Moreover, an increase in public savings can be sufficiently valued by the private 
sector which can then increase its consumption while reducing it savings, which once again, 
tend to leaves unchanged the volume of domestic savings. 
We can multiply the examples, but the truth is evident: the relationship between these two 
macroeconomic variables (savings and investment) is ambiguous and complex. Solving the 
problem with an empirical point of view is one of the ways to resolve the indeterminacy. 
2.3. Heterogeneity between countries and causality direction between savings and 
investment: Divergent empirical results.  
The problem of heterogeneity in an economic and monetary union has been highlighted by 
several theoretical and empirical studies. Nguena, C. L., (2011) for example have undertake 
the problem of Individual Heterogeneity applied to Sub Saharan African context by verifying 
improvement in terms of specification and estimation of economic growth model, linked to 
the consideration or not of individual heterogeneity; He found that taking into account 
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individual heterogeneity improves the quality of the model; Thus this implies that the same 
economic policy may lead to different results in different countries and that it is desirable that 
economic policy decision for several countries must consider countries individual 
characteristics before implementation.  
Concerning the types of causal relationship between savings and investment especially, 
although few in number, some empirical works are instructive. As such, we can first retain the 
studies of Palley (1996) for the U.S. case and Alexiou (2004) with regard to some countries in 
the euro zone. Both authors argue that the empirical determination of the saving-investment 
causality should inform the budgetary authority on the relative superiority of one or other 
budgetary option including: abstinence or increased investment expenditure. Palley (1996) 
adopts a methodology based on the Granger test and on analysis of impulse response 
functions to validate the hypothesis of Keynesian "paradox of thrift" on U.S. data. His 
findings are that investment tends to precede the increase in savings and an increase in 
savings greatly reduces the investment through its negative effect on aggregate demand. 
Alexiou (2004) adopts a similar approach to that adopted by Palley (1996) with a slightly 
different in that the impulse response functions have been abandoned in favor of an analysis 
of variance decomposition of error forecast. It leads to results that investment generally 
precedes savings in euro area countries retained, but the analysis of variance decomposition 
results still leaves a relative heterogeneity between countries. The author then concludes that 
these differences in results could find explanation by exploring the structures of these 
countries, including differences in financial structures. Greenidge et al (2004) undertook to 
test the theoretical hypothesis that one of the channels through which financial development 
affects economic growth is that it favors capital accumulation through greater allocation from 
savings to investment. The authors wanted to bring the savings-investment causality direction 
issue to the levels of financial development for the Caribbean and Latin America countries. 
The saving-investment causality was tested by using a methodology based on the recent 
cointegration. However, the authors do not systematically come to the result that the level of 
financial development shaped the saving-investment causality in their sample. 
Studies of causation devoted to African countries do not relatively exist. Nevertheless, we 
have identified two of them. Elbadawi and Mwega (2000) find a causal rate of domestic 
savings to domestic investment in Sub-Saharan Africa using the Granger causality (1969) and 
aggregate data from across the region; Unlikely Agbetsiafa (2002) makes use of causality 
tests from vector representations error correction in countries like Ivory Coast, Nigeria, South 
Africa, Zambia and Kenya; Causality is everywhere from savings to investment, except in 
South Africa where prevails a bidirectional causality between domestic saving and 
investment. 
At this point, two main conclusions emerge. The first which have a more methodological 
importance, is that the determination of causation is generally made on a case by case basis 
(by country) which has conditioned the use of countries time series. The second conclusion 
seems in turn related to the first well; Indeed, the saving-investment causality seems to be 
conditioned by national structural specificities, which requires to use countries-analyzes. 
Methodological approaches within the studies that have analyzed empirically the savings - 
investment relationship are diverse and have not always addressed the important issue of 
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causality between these two variables. First, a number of studies have used ordinary least 
squares on a single equation to examine the savings - investment relationship. Therefore they 
have unfortunately suffered of the major econometric problem of simultaneity bias, due to the 
fact that they have neglected the possibility of return effect. Furthermore, these studies have 
made direct estimation without first analyzing the time series properties of saving and 
investment. However, as shown by Nelson and Plosser (1982), most macroeconomic time 
series are non stationary in levels. Then a large number of empirical studies have used cross-
sectional estimates, which made extremely difficult to apply their results to a specific country. 
Finally, very few of these studies have involved Africa. 
These empirical studies allow us to confirm the heterogeneity of saving-investment 
relationship in African sub region and therefore Africa. This situation has to been seriously 
undertaken if we plan to see the continental integration happen one day. However we have to 
verify it with an empirical investigation on WAEMU monetary union as a sample. 
This study is therefore strongly motivated by the fact that firstly there is a theoretical 
indeterminacy concerning the causality direction between savings and investment; Secondly 
this indeterminacy is reinforced at the National Accounting level and thirdly there is divergent 
empirical results concerning the causality direction between savings and investment. 
The total savings in the economy is indeed the sum of budget surplus, household savings and 
retained earnings of private enterprises. How can we be sure that the increase in one 
component of domestic savings, for example, will leave other components unchanged? 
Indeed, an increase in taxes, while increasing public savings, will reduce disposable private 
income and hence private savings, thus leaving relatively unchanged the total savings; It is the 
neutrality of boosting investment policy funded on a prior rise in public savings which will be 
observed. Moreover, an increase in public savings can be sufficiently valued by the private 
sector which can then increase its consumption while reducing it savings, which once again, 
tend to leaves unchanged the volume of domestic savings. 
We can multiply the examples, but the truth is evident: the relationship between these two 
macroeconomic variables (savings and investment) is ambiguous and complex. Solving the 
problem with an empirical point of view is one of the ways to resolve the indeterminacy. 
 
3. Methodology. 
Methodological approaches within the studies that have analyzed empirically the savings - 
investment relationship are diverse and have not always addressed the important issue of 
causality between these two variables. First, a number of studies have used Ordinary Least 
Squares on a single equation to examine the savings - investment relationship. Therefore they 
have unfortunately suffered of the major econometric problem of simultaneity bias, due to the 
fact that they have neglected the possibility of return effect. Furthermore, these studies have 
made direct estimation without first analyzing the time series properties of saving and 
investment. However, as shown by Nelson and Plosser (1982), most macroeconomic time 
series are non stationary in levels. Then a large number of empirical studies have used cross-
sectional estimates, which made it extremely difficult to apply their results to a specific 
country. Finally, very few of these studies have involved Africa. 
 
This study goes beyond these methodological shortcomings by resorting exclusively to recent 
techniques within the time series econometrics to determine the causality direction. 
 
Empirically, to test causality, it is common to apply the Granger causality test (1969). 
However, the cointegration technique promoted by Engle and Granger (1987) and Granger 
(1988) provides a significant contribution in conducting the causality tests. As part of our 
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study, tests of causality based on vector representations of error correction are used for each 
of the WAEMU countries. 
 
3.1. From cointegration to causality. 
The vector model with error correction requires that the series used are cointegrated. It is 
therefore important to first test the existence of cointegration relationships between the series 
(Johansen, 1988) prior to estimating equations of the VECM. The starting point is a VAR 
representation like follow: 
 tit
p
i
t xx   



1
1
                   (1)        
where x is a vector (n x 1) of variables that can be I (0) or I (1).   is a matrix (n x n) of 
coefficients,   is a vector (n x 1) of interference with normal properties. 
  
If there is a cointegrating relationship between the variables I (1), the above equation must be 
change and we obtain the following vector representation with error correction VECM: 
ttti
p
i
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Where Δ is the difference operator, and θ is a matrix (n x n) of coefficients. The rank, r, of the 
matrix   determines the number of cointegrating relationships. If the rank of this matrix is n 
or equal to zero, the VAR model is estimated respectively at level or at first difference; This 
due to the fact that there is no cointegrating relationship between variables in the model. 
 
However, if the matrix rank   is less than n, then there are (n x r) matrices   (cointegration 
parameters) and   (adjustment matrix that describes the weight with what each variable 
enters the equation) so that    and, equation (2) is chosen as the model to be 
estimated. The matrix   is estimated (by the method of maximum likelihood) as an 
unrestricted VAR undergoing test to determine whether the restrictions implied by the 
reduced rank of the matrix   may be, or not, rejected.  
 
The statistics used to determine the rank (cointegration) of the matrix   are given by the 
Trace statistic: 
trace = - T 


k
ri
i
1
)1log(  , for r = 0, 1, …, k-1 and i  the i-th eigenvalue of the matrix  , 
T = number of observations, k = number of variables, r = matrix rank. 
 and the statistics maximum eingenvalue, which is given by: 
)1log(max rT          
The statistics of Johansen (1988) follow a probability distribution (similar to a 
2 ) tabulated 
using simulations by Johansen and Juselius (1990). 
 
By performing the cointegration test (Johansen) on internal savings (s) and investment (i) 
variable (in neperien logarithm), the VECM representation between these two variables should 
be written: 
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Where   capture the adjustment speed from a state of imbalance to the long-term 
relationship. This imbalance is defined here as the gap that exists between lagged values of a 
variable of domestic saving and investment 1211   tt sigap  . If saving and 
investment are cointegrated, the deviations from the long-run equilibrium has the effect in the 
short term, to induce changes in the evolution of one or all variables in order to force the 
system return to its long-run equilibrium. 
 
The equation of cointegration between saving and investment is written:  
ECTt-1 = β1it-1 + β2st—1 and ECTt-1 =it-1 + (β2/ β1) st-1 depending on whether it was normalized 
to investment or   ECTt-1 = (β1/ β2) it-1 + st-1 if we have normalized with respect to savings. 
 
Unlike the Granger standard test (1969), this alternate methodology based on the error 
correction mechanism, consider the possibility that the passed value of a level variable (eg y) 
may help explain common variations of other variable (eg x), although past values of 
differentiated series y cannot. The intuition is as follows: If x and y follows a common and 
constant path over time, the common variations of x are partially the result of an adjustment of 
x in order to meet its alignment with it. This causality cannot be detected by the Granger 
standard test (1969) who has only identified the possibility that past changes in one variable 
can help explain current changes in another variable. 
As for the Granger standard test, it is possible to determine causality in the opposite direction 
or when there is a causality in both directions. However, if the two variables are co integrated, 
causality exists in at least one direction. The result of total lack of causality in any direction 
identified by the test of Granger (1969) is switched off here; As soon as the series follow a 
common trend, there will always be at least one causality. 
 
To perform the test, we rely on the representation (3) and estimated each following equation 
(4) and (5), with i and s respectively investment and domestic savings. 
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This procedure is preferred to the standard Granger (1969) because it allows to show a 
temporal causality emanating from (i) the sum of independent variables coefficients in first 
difference and lagged ( , ) et (ii) the return term  . In addition, the error correction 
model allows the identification of causality even though the lagged and differentiated 
coefficients of explanatory variables are not significant (Miller and Russek, 1990). 
 
3.2. Causality sources and types. 
There are therefore two causality sources, one from the cointegration equation if   0 and 
the other from the differentiated and lagged variables coefficients. The cointegration equation 
(ECT) measures the relationship of long-term equilibrium, while the coefficients of lagged 
variables refer to the short-term dynamics. The significance of the coefficient associated with 
ECT highlights the existence of an error correction mechanism that leads to the variables 
return to their long term condition.  
Given the existence of different sources of causality (short term or long term, which is 
impossible to perceive if we use the classic Granger causality test), we present three different 
tests used in the literature Recent: The short term causality test, the long-term causality test 
and the strong exogeneity test. 
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 The short term causality test. 
In the previous model (3), to test « ts  does not cause ti  at short-term», we examines the 
significance of the coefficients of lagged variables by testing the null hypothesis Ho: All i1 = 
0 by using Wald test. Failure to reject the null hypothesis implies that domestic savings does 
not cause domestic investment in the short term. 
 The long-term causality test (or weak exogeneity). 
The test of weak exogeneity which refers to the notion of long-term causality test (long-run 
non - causality test) is done by testing the null hypothesis H0 : 1 = 0, if the null hypothesis is 
not rejected it implies that domestic investment is "weakly exogenous" because it does not 
address the imbalance that can occur. If instead the null hypothesis is rejected, the change in 
investment is due to the influence of long-term equilibrium relationship and long-term 
causality is established from savings to investment. The null hypothesis is tested by using the 
maximum likelihood test (LR). 
 The strong exogeneity test. 
Finally, we present the strong exogeneity test, which imposes strong restrictions attached by 
testing the significance of lagged variables (short-term dynamics) and the equation 
cointegration ECT. This test verifies the short term and long term causality. In particular, 
« ts  does not cause ti  » if the null hypothesis Ho : All i1 = 1 = 0 is not rejected. The 
strong exogeneity test does not distinguish short-run and long-term causality; It is a more 
restrictive test that indicates the global causality in the system. 
In summary, the non-significance of all coefficients tested involves the "strong exogeneity" of 
the variable (investment or savings). 
 
4. Data source and empirical results. 
4.1. Data source. 
Data cover the period 1980-2010 for each country and source from the database of the World 
Bank (World Development Indicators, 2011). The sample includes all seven UEMOA 
member countries namely Benin, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Senegal 
and Togo.  
 
4.2. Empirical investigation results: 
4.2.1. Stationarity and Johansen cointegration tests results: 
The observation of stationarity tests and Johansen cointegration tests results presented in 
annex lead us to conclude the following: The existence of cointegrating relationship between 
savings and investment in Benin, Mali and Senegal let us forecast at least the existence of a 
causal relationship between domestic saving and investment in each country. 
 
4.2.2. Results of short and long term causality tests:  
The table bellow provides estimation results summarize in each country of the various tests of 
causality. The estimation result details have been annexed. For four countries (Benin, Ivory 
Coast, Mali and Senegal), there is long-term causality between two variables. Specifically for 
Ivory Coast and Senegal, the direction of causality runs from savings to investment, while for 
Benin and Mali it is rather from investment to savings. The results also confirm the absence of 
a short-term causality between the two variables for all countries. The following table 
summarizes these different causality results country by country. 
 
Table: Abstract of causality test results. 
 
Countries 
Long term  Short term 
s . . .?. . . i i . . .? . . .s s . . .?. . . i or i . . .? . . .s 
Benin   (+) absence 
Burkina Faso absence absence 
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Ivory Coast  (+)  absence 
Guinea Bissau absence absence 
Mali   (+) absence 
Senegal  (+)  absence 
Togo Absence absence 
Source: Author’s calculations with World Bank Data Base (2011) 
 
Finally we can affirm that we have three groups of countries in the WAEMU zone. The first 
group of countries for which a causality from savings to investment is long-term; This is Ivory 
Coast and Senegal. The second group consists of countries for which reverse causality 
prevails (Benin and Mali) and the third group of countries for which no causality is 
statistically significant (Burkina Faso, Guinea Bissau and Togo). 
 
Following these results, it appears that the increased volume of domestic savings will 
ultimately ensure increased investment in only two countries: Ivory Coast and Senegal. In the 
rest of countries, an increase in savings does not have the same virtuous effects. Hence, it 
follows that the WAEMU zone countries do not all need equivalent therapies to stimulate 
strong and sustained economic growth. 
 
5. Economic policy implications 
Our empirical results show that for the two former countries (Ivory Coast and Senegal), 
policies of abstinence would be appropriate because they would generate a significant volume 
of domestic savings to finance domestic investment. It is therefore a problem of inadequate 
financial resources which explains the low investment and growth in these countries, 
including the existence of dual internal and external financial constraints. For other countries, 
an increase in their volume of domestic savings is not a necessary and sufficient condition to 
ensure capital formation and thereby ensure economic growth. Saving does not precede 
investment in these countries, and therefore, pro-savings policies are totally inappropriate. In 
these countries we should identify investment irreversibility factors in order to significantly 
reduce them and, ultimately increase investment spending. The strategy is to focus directly on 
investment, not on savings, because savings would neither have short- nor long-term virtuous 
effects. 
 
The WAEMU zone’s heterogeneity is like countries have different saving-investment 
dynamics and thus optimal fiscal policies that should be different. However, it should not be 
forgotten that these countries are members of a monetary union. It is clear from our results 
that the optimal budget strategies for these countries are not similar, we should not forget that 
fiscal policies in the WAEMU zone are constrained by a standard that limits public deficit, 
which can significantly reduce the discretion of national authorities in countries where the 
optimal fiscal strategy is directly related to the investment rate. Thus, as the recent debate on 
the practice of a single monetary policy in a heterogeneous union tends to lead to the need to 
integrate the heterogeneity in the monetary standard rules, as the heterogeneity issue in the 
union must also be present in the fiscal arrangements design in a monetary union. If the 
benefits of coordination in relation to different policies are well established, what should 
matter is choosing the right coordination which will eventually equalize between all partner 
countries, costs and benefits of membership in the union.  
 
How then can heterogeneity and optimal coordination in the African monetary union be 
reconciled? This can be done by reflecting on a new fiscal rule that would be more 
appropriate and which will have the dual advantage of combining flexibility and credibility 
while promoting economic catch-up in the area. A flexible fiscal rule is a rule that does not 
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sanction the budgetary authorities frequently; But governments of the monetary union are not 
always able to respect the current fiscal convergence criteria. Moreover, a fiscal rule is 
credible when it punishes appropriately. However, the fiscal rule at community level in the 
monetary union goes against any deficit. We therefore feel that governments bind their hands 
while the critical development needs are felt. Therefore, questioning this criterion is important 
because macroeconomic costs associated with this rule are high. A ceiling on the current 
public deficit can be structurally depressing for growth. If, as suggested by some recent 
theoretical and empirical work, the potential growth is influenced by government spending 
that contribute to productive capital formation or to increase productivity, the fiscal policies 
rules that lead governments to reduce this type of expenditure are doubly harmful because: 
they generate pro-cyclical fiscal policies variations and lower the potential growth path of the 
economy in every recession. Yet it is possible to design a rule on the government deficit, 
which avoids this serious pitfall. Like Creel, Latreille and The Cacheux (2002), we advocate a 
rule of nullity of the deficit: 
- Structural: A relevant fiscal indicator should reveal the orientation of discretionary fiscal 
policy. In this sense, the structural deficit, after corrections for cyclical effects on the total 
deficit, should be considered as an indicator of the stance of fiscal policy in the monetary 
union. 
- Without public investment: The second criterion indicates that the public investment 
expenditure is not constrained by the rule. This would give monetary union member states a 
substantial leeway, allowing them to implement massive economic stimulus packages to 
offset the effects of the current stagnation of activity and, for countries that need it (Benin, 
Mali, Togo, Burkina Faso and Guinea Bissau in the case of WAEMU), to economically catch-
up their partners by improving their public infrastructure and education supply, sources of 
potential growth. 
Such rule would release free investment and ideally reflect the discretionary fiscal policy 
orientation; It would thus enjoy greater flexibility and credibility, but would face a major 
problem, particularly, the structural balance measure. 
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Appendix 
 
1) BENIN 
- Stationarity test : 
Trend and intercept 
 
  LEVEL First difference Second difference  
  ADF CV ADF CV ADF CV 
INV  1.333036 -3.587527 -1.882750 -3.603202 -10.95744 -3.603202 
S -0.021983 -3.587527 -5.205564 -3.595026  /  / 
 
INV est I(2) et S est I(1) 
 
- Johansen cointégration test   
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) 
     
     
Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     
None *  0.476314  32.81319  12.32090  0.0000 
At most 1 *  0.459458  15.99477  4.129906  0.0001 
     
     
 Trace test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 
- Short term causality test  
Lags: 1  
    
    
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
    
    
  D(S) does not Granger Cause D(D(INV)) 25  0.08756  0.77007 
  D(D(INV)) does not Granger Cause D(S)  0.00053  0.98177 
    
    
 
 Causality absence 
 
- Long term Granger causality test 
 
 
 
   
    
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
    
    
  S does not Granger Cause INV 27  1.25565  0.27356 
  INV does not Granger Cause S  28.2170  1.9E-05 
    
    
Investment  cause savings. 
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2) BURKINA-FASO 
- Stationarity test   
  LEVEL First difference  Second difference  
  ADF CV ADF CV ADF CV 
INV -1.556921 -3.603202 -3.366407 -3.603202 -6.277407 -3.612199 
S -1.827521 -3.690814 -6.910576 -3.690814     
INV is I(2) when S is I(1) 
 
- Johansen cointégration test   
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) 
     
     
Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     
None  0.283826  6.414474  12.32090  0.3873 
At most 1  0.022276  0.405508  4.129906  0.5877 
     
     
 Trace test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 
There is no cointegration relation. 
 
- Short term causality test  
  
Lags: 1  
    
    
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
    
    
  D(S) does not Granger Cause D(D(INV)) 17  0.00807  0.92971 
  D(D(INV)) does not Granger Cause D(S)  3.34621  0.08874 
    
    
 
Causality absence  
 
- Granger causality test   
Lags: 1  
    
    
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
    
    
  S does not Granger Cause INV 20  0.74040  0.40151 
  INV does not Granger Cause S  0.06756  0.79804 
    
    
 
Causality absence   
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3) IVORY COAST  
- Stationarity test   
 
  LEVEL First difference  
INV -2.527338 -3.574244 -4.774915 -3.580623 
S -1.696037 -3.574244 -5.657587 -3.580623 
 
All series are integreted in order 1 
 
- Johensen cointégration test  
  
 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) 
     
     
Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     
None  0.166005  6.062838  12.32090  0.4284 
At most 1  0.034396  0.980044  4.129906  0.3736 
     
     
 Trace test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 
There is no cointegration relation between investment and savings. 
 
- Short term causality test   
Lags: 1  
    
    
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
    
    
  D(S) does not Granger Cause D(INV) 28  0.71330  0.40636 
  D(INV) does not Granger Cause D(S)  0.09920  0.75540 
    
    
No causality 
- Granger causality test   
Lags: 1 
 
 
 
    
    
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
    
    
  S does not Granger Cause INV 29  11.5909  0.00216 
  INV does not Granger Cause S  0.10223  0.75173 
    
    
S cause INV 
4) GUINEE-BISSAU 
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- Stationarity test   
  LEVEL  First difference  
INV -1.743625 -3.658446 -4.724146 -3.690814 
S -2.105865 -3.791172 -6.040698 -3.791172 
All series are integreted in order 1. 
 
- Johansen cointégration test   
     
     
Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     
None  0.360295  6.255635  12.32090  0.4055 
At most 1  8.37E-05  0.001172  4.129906  0.9791 
     
     
 Trace test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 
There is no cointegration   
  
- Short term causality test   
    
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
    
    
  D(S) does not Granger Cause D(INV) 14  0.00014  0.99061 
  D(INV) does not Granger Cause D(S)  0.21735  0.65016 
    
 
No causality. 
 
- Long term causality test   
  
Lags: 1  
    
    
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
    
    
  S does not Granger Cause INV 16  1.61813  0.22564 
  INV does not Granger Cause S  0.07774  0.78477 
    
    
No causality 
 
 
 
 
 
5) MALI 
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- Stationarity test  
  LEVEL First difference  
INV  0.690846 -3.595026 -7.829135 -3.595026 
S  0.108273 -3.603202 -4.010726 -3.622033 
  
All series are cointegreted in order 1. 
 
- Johansen cointégration test   
 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) 
     
     
Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     
None *  0.636512  23.36405  12.32090  0.0005 
At most 1  0.003812  0.087840  4.129906  0.8076 
     
     
 Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values  
 
There is no cointegration relation. 
 
- Short term causality test   
Lags: 1  
    
    
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
    
    
  D(S) does not Granger Cause D(INV) 23  4.34151  0.05023 
  D(INV) does not Granger Cause D(S)  3.08184  0.09448 
    
    
No causality 
 
- Granger causality test   
Lags: 1  
    
    
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
    
    
  S does not Granger Cause INV 25  0.34023  0.56563 
  INV does not Granger Cause S  4.31284  0.04971 
    
    
 
Investment cause savings. 
6) SENEGAL 
 
17 
 
- Unit root Test   
  LEVEL First difference  
INV -0.596670 -3.574244 -4.423356 -3.580623 
S  0.392427 -3.580623 -8.214434 -3.580623 
 
All series are integreted in first order. 
 
- Johansen cointégration test   
 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) 
     
     
Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     
None *  0.398607  15.28752  12.32090  0.0155 
At most 1  0.036782  1.049315  4.129906  0.3551 
     
     
 Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
  
There is one cointegration relation. 
- Short term causality test   
Lags: 1  
    
    
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
    
    
  D(S) does not Granger Cause D(INV) 28  1.29464  0.26598 
  D(INV) does not Granger Cause D(S)  1.15262  0.29326 
    
    
 
No causality 
 
- Test de causalité de Granger 
 
 
   
    
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
    
    
  S does not Granger Cause INV 29  9.90591  0.00410 
  INV does not Granger Cause S  0.08860  0.76833 
    
    
 
Domestic savings granger cause domestic investment. 
 
7) TOGO 
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- Stationarity test   
 
LEVEL First difference  
Variable ADF CV ADF CV 
INV -2.391790 -3.603202 -5.415838 -3.612199 
S -3.664734 -3.603202 
  INV is stationary in first difference and S is at level.
 
- Johansen cointegration test  
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace) 
     
     
Hypothesized  Trace 0.05  
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.** 
     
     
None  0.134879  5.437904  12.32090  0.5077 
At most 1  0.078446  1.960643  4.129906  0.1902 
     
     
 Trace test indicates no cointegration at the 0.05 level 
 * Denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level 
 
There is no cointegration relation between INV and S. 
 
- Short term causality test.   
Lags: 1  
    
    
  Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
    
    
  S does not Granger Cause D(INV) 24  2.23939  0.14941 
  D(INV) does not Granger Cause S  0.08625  0.77188 
    
    
 
No causality 
 
- Granger causality test (Long term). 
    
    
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Probability 
    
    
S does not Granger Cause INV 25 2.85737 0.10508 
INV does not Granger Cause S 2.22934 0.14962 
    
    
 
No causality 
 
 
 
 
19 
Bibliography: 
1) Asongu, S. A., (2013a), “A Short-run Schumpeterian Trip to Embryonic African Monetary 
Zones”, Economics Bulletin, 33(1), pp. 859-873 (2013). 
2) Asongu, S. A., (2013b), “Real and Monetary Policy Convergence: EMU Crisis to the CFA 
Zone”, Journal of Financial Economic Policy, 5(1), pp. 20-38 (2013).  
3) Asongu, S. A., (2013c), “Are Proposed African Monetary Unions Optimal Currency 
Areas? Real, Monetary and Fiscal Policy Convergence Analysis”, African Journal of 
Economics and Management Studies: Forthcoming.  
4) Agbetsiafa D., (2002),"Capital Mobility, Saving and Investment Link: Evidence from Sub-
Saharan Africa." Journal of African Finance and Economic Development. 5:2 77 88. 
5) Alexiou C., (2004), “An econometric investigation into the macroeconomic Relationship 
between saving and investment: Evidence from EU Region”, International Review of Applied 
Economics, vol.18, 1, p 93-102. 
6) Bencivenga V. and Smith, B., (1991), “Financial     Intermediation    and     Endogenous  
Growth”, The Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 58, No. 2, April. 
7) Blecker R., (1997), “Policy implications of the international saving – investment 
correlation”, in R. Pollin (Ed.) The Macroeconomics of Saving, Finance, and Investment (Ann 
Arbor MI: The University of Michigan Press). 
8) Creel J., Latreille T. and Le Cacheux, J., (2002), “Le   Pacte de   Stabilité   et   les 
politiques budgétaires dans l’Union Européenne”, Revue de l’OFCE, hors série, p 245-272.  
9) Elbadawi I. and F. Mwega, (2000), “Can Africa’s Saving Collapse be Reversed?” World 
Bank Economic Review, Vol 14, n° 3 Pp. 415-443  
10) Engle, R. F. and Granger, C.W., (1987), “Cointegration and Error Correction:     
Representation, Estimation, and Testing” Econometrica 55, p 251-276. 
11) Feldstein M. and Horioka, C., (1980), “Domestic Saving and International Capital 
Flows”, Economic Journal, 90, 314-329. 
12) Goldsmith R., (1969), “Financial structure and Development”. New Haven, Yale 
University Press. 
13) Godley W. and Cripps J., (1985), “Macroeconomics”, Oxford University Press, London. 
14) Gordon D., (1995), “Putting the horse (back) before the cart: disentangling the macro 
relationship between investment and saving”, in Epstein A. G. & Gintis M. H. (Eds) 
Macroeconomic Policy After the Conservative Era Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
15) Granger C.W., (1969), "Investigating Causal Relations by Econometric Models and 
Cross-Spectral Methods" Econometrica, 37, p 424-438. 
16) Granger C.W., (1988), "Some Recent Developments in a Concept of Causality," Journal 
of Econometrics, 39, p.199-211. 
17) Greenidge K., Milner C. and Reed, G., (2004), “Financial development and the saving-
investment-growth nexus: Evidence from the Caribbean and Latin America, Presentation at 
the Caribbean Centre for Monetary Studies Annual Conference, 1-5   Novembre, 2004. 
18) Gurley J. G. and Shaw, E. S., (1956), “Financial intermediaries and Saving – Investment 
Process”, Journal of Finance, vol. 11, n°2, mai 1956. 
19) Harcourt G. and Spajic, L., (1998), “Post-Keynesianism”, Working Paper, Cambridge. 
20) Jansen W., Gunther G. and Schulze, G., (1996), “Theory-Based Measurement of the 
Saving-Investment Correlation with an Application to Norway.” Economic Inquiry Vol.34, 
No.1, pp. 116–132.  
 
20 
21) Johansen S., (1988), “Statistical analysis of cointegration vectors,” Journal of Economic 
Dynamics and Control, Vol. 12, pp. 231–254. Reprinted in R.F. Engle and C.W.J. Granger 
(eds.), Long-Run Economic Relationships, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991, 131–52.  
22) Johansen S. and Juselius, K., (1990), "Maximum Likelihood Estimation and Inference on 
Cointegration--with Applications to the Demand for Money," Oxford Bulletin of Economics 
and Statistics, 52, 169-210. 
23) Johansen S., (1995), “Likelihood-based Inference in Cointegrated Vector Autoregressive 
Models”, Oxford University Press. 
24) Kamgnia D. and Touna Mama, (2002), « Le Comportement de l’Investissement Privé au 
Cameroun : Un Resserrement de la Contrainte Financière ? », Working Papers n°1/2002, 
Cahiers du SISERA, 25 p.  
25) Keynes, J.M., (1936), “The general theory of employment, interest and money”, 
MacMillan, London. 
26) Mac Kinnon, R., (1973), “Money and Capital in Economic Development, Brookings 
Institution”, Washington DC.  
27) Miller, S. M. and Russek, F. S., (1990), “Cointegration and error-correction models: The 
temporal causality between Government taxes and spending”, Southern Economic Journal 
221- 229.  
28) Nelson C. R. and Plosser, C. I., (1982), "Trends and Random Walks in Macroeconomic 
Time Series: Some Evidence and Implications", Journal of Monetary Economics, 10. 
29) Nguena, C. L., (2011), “Individual Heterogeneity Problem in Panel Data: An Application 
on Foreign Trade Role in Sub-Saharan Africa Countries Economic Growth”.  
http://wbiconpro.com/202-Christian.pdf 
30) Palley T., (1996), “The Saving-Investment Nexus: Why it Matters and How it Works”, 
Center for Economic Policy Analysis wp 1, 1996. p 613-622. 
31) Shaw E., (1973), “Financial Deepening in Economic Development”, New-York, Oxford 
University Press. 
32) Skott P., (1989), “Conflict and Effective Demand in Economic Growth”, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press. 
33) Sodokin K., (2004), “Epargne, système de financement et développement économique en 
Afrique : une alternative post-keynésienne”, Communication au Colloque « Développement 
durable : Leçons et perspectives », du 1
er
 au 4 juin 2004, Ouagadougou, Burkina-Faso.  
 
